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 4 
Introduction 
 
 
Organ transplantation is considered one of the most dramatic interventions in 
modern medicine. Having witnessed such a procedure myself at the University of 
Washington Medical Center, I can attest to the fact that organ transplantation is both an 
icon of medical accomplishment and a troubling realm of medicine, both in the lay 
imagination and in its vast procedural complexities.   
Producing a combination of curiosity, anxiety, fear, and celebration, organ 
transplantation has generated a plethora of literature due to its persistent ability to 
fascinate and perplex people. This thesis seeks to examine gothic counter-narratives that 
resist the dominant metaphors and trends in medical transplant commentary. These 
stories constitute the often unseen and unspoken tales in circulation about the meaning 
and experience of organ transplantation in US culture. Unlike the multitude of first-
person narratives that one finds on transplantation websites, all of which seem to 
participate in a single overarching narrative of recovery and restitution through 
transplantation, the stories I examine write against this prescriptive form and speak to 
the underlying anxieties produced by a procedure that reconfigures the biological 
boundaries between bodies and conjures up vivid associations and rearticulations of the 
relationship between the self and the other (UNOS).  
For the sake of establishing legitimacy, the medical establishment has attempted 
to normalize the process of transplantation through unemotional, technical language 
that represents the body as a machine or through the use of the pervading “gift of life” 
metaphor to induce compliance (Siminoff 34-41). Transplant centers encourage organ 
recipients to adopt these metaphors and their proliferation in patients’ first-person 
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narratives demonstrates that it has worked. In contrast, the use of gothic imagery to 
describe organ transfer is seen by some transplant clinicians as pathological, and 
recipients are discouraged from dwelling on the donor’s death, the foreign tissue, or their 
changed sense of self (Sharp 23-4). Organ transplant recipients receive newsletters, 
bulletins and circulars produced by their respective transplant centers and are thus 
educated in the appropriate conventions of narrating their transplant story. These 
patients often reproduce the language, metaphors and narratives of the advocacy 
literature they encounter (Jensen 113). 
Despite these attempts to create a standard, dispassionate arc for this complex 
and transformative process, the literature I examine contains gothic elements that re-
imbue the process with emotion and highlight organ transplantation’s dark associations 
with organ theft, racial exploitation, and intrusion and identity disruption. Ultimately 
using these texts, I argue for the importance of changing the dominant metaphors of 
transplant from those of a simple “gift” or “spare part” to address the more intricate 
questions about the hybridization of human bodies, definitions of death, race, identity, 
and bodily integrity that are raised by this process. By examining the interconnections 
between medical discourse and literary tradition, I hope to contribute to the uncovering 
of deeper meanings, both cultural and medical, associated with organ transplantation 
and advance the understanding of post-transplant personhood. 
As a surgical technique and modern reality, organ transplantation took its first 
steps forward mid-1950s. The invention of dialysis machines during World War II was 
an important milestone that led to the first successful kidney transplant involving 
identical twins in 1954 (Caplan 23; Wood 4). Rejection, the term used when a person’s 
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immune system attacks a foreign transplanted organ, of the kidney was prevented by the 
twins’ genetic similarity, and the recipient was able to live another 8 years. This 
breakthrough demonstrated the procedure’s feasibility and miraculous quality, enabling 
a chronically ill patient to improve the quality and increase the longevity of his life. Most 
Americans, however, are far more familiar with the dramatic and highly publicized 
event in 1967 in South Africa, when Christiaan Barnard removed a healthy, still-beating, 
heart from car accident victim Denise Darvall and placed it in Louis Washkansky 
(Columbia); Washkansky survived just eighteen days (Lederer 201-2). Still, the story 
captivated people’s imaginations, producing both anxiety and amazement, due to the 
extraordinary meaning with which the heart as an organ is invested. It was soon 
recognized that the major problem impeding the success of organ transplants was the 
body's natural tendency to reject foreign tissues. The mid-1970s development of 
cyclosporine and other immunosuppressants that prevent the rejection of foreign tissues 
did away with this problem, revolutionizing the field and making transplantation a 
regular event in many large urban hospitals throughout the United States (Columbia). 
Still, the process is not without its continued complexities; organ transplant recipients 
have to take immunosuppressants for the rest of their lives and deal with new 
complications like the increased incidence of infection or cancer as a result of having a 
depressed immune system.  
From a cultural and legal standpoint, organ transplantation also required 
approval. The process was legitimized by the medical community shortly after the 1967 
heart transplant performed by Christiaan Barnard through a redefinition of death. In 
1968, a committee at Harvard Medical School adopted new criteria for delineating the 
boundary between life and death (Greenburg); instead of cardiac death, brain death 
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became the new standard, in large part, to facilitate organ donation. The new definition 
was largely an outgrowth of transplant’s great paradox: the need for both a living body 
and a dead donor. It would never be acceptable to kill someone for his organs. But, 
ideally, a donor would be alive at the time his organs were harvested, because as soon as 
the flow of oxygenated blood stops, a process called warm ischemia quickly begins to 
ruin them (Greenburg). Thus, a new artificial boundary of death allowed doctors to 
remove organs as the heart continued to beat and supply recipients with well-
functioning organs. 
Today, an entire sophisticated transplant industry has been constructed to 
facilitate the effective execution of this tangled process. It is equipped with waiting lists 
containing scoring systems, procurement agencies, specialized surgical teams, national 
donor programs, and transportation networks (UNOS). For the medical establishment, 
the issue with organ transplantation now appears to be one of organ availability rather 
than feasibility. From a sociocultural standpoint, the concerns are multifarious and 
distinct. The history of transplantation is rife with ethical problems and deep-seated 
public concerns and to this day, the process continues to generate a host of perplexing 
questions about bodily integrity, the definition of death, commodification, hybridization 
of human bodies, and the embodied self.  Literature and film step in to explore these 
problems, springing up to help make sense of a new technological process that 
transforms the human body. 
While the removal, distribution, and successful incorporation of organs from one 
human being to another is considered a routine practice, discussions of the sociocultural 
implications of organ transplantation actually precede its technological possibility, 
showing the long history transplants have in the cultural imaginary. In early folktales, 
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the accidental transplant of an animal's organ gives its human recipient animal 
characteristics (Brunvand 207-09). Early experimentation also appears in religious 
legends and the artwork of Spanish artist Jaime Huguet (c. 1448-1492), who depicted St. 
Cosmas and St. Damian transplanting the leg of an Ethiopian gladiator onto a Christian 
bell-tower keeper. Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus, first 
published in 1818, has developed an especially strong association with organ 
transplantation in its depiction of a creature formed from the bits and pieces of corpses 
through scientific experimentation. Shelley’s text is referenced time and time again to 
exhibit many of the fears that contribute to public and medical debates about organ 
transplantation. Frankenstein touches on anxieties about death and monstrosity that 
are as unspeakable, socially, as the acknowledgement of the limitations of a post-
transplantation life or the acknowledgement that donor organs are a far from simple gift 
(MacDonald 216).  
In the decades since transplantation became a medical reality, a dense and 
diverse discourse about the process has continued to emerged. Transplant discourse 
emanates from the myriad cultural centers that the transplanted body disrupts: law, 
government, medicine, ethics, social science, and religion. In movies and in fiction, 
stories of invading organs, ghosts, monstrous post-surgical bodies enter the popular 
imagination alongside stories in real life: for instance, news articles of China’s brutal 
practices in live organ harvesting and illegal organ trafficking that targets the non-vital 
body parts of the poor all over the world (“2011 Human Rights Report”). 
The American medical establishment has attempted to distance itself from these 
issues, assuming a heavily biomedical and complex bureaucratic approach to the human 
body. Transplant professionals regularly describe body parts as inert objects, wholly 
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disconnected with one’s personhood. The whole process of replacing a vital organ is 
essentially compared to the repair of a complex and fragile machine. With this 
instrumental view of the body, those who receive the organ are simply getting a “spare 
part.” Even the language used to describe the person from whom one receives an organ 
is depersonalized; they are referred as brain-dead cadaveric donors, never patients. No 
information can even be released about the donor or his family (Orioff, et al. 581). For 
people who wish to know more, only a de-identified letter can be sent by the recipient 
family through UNOS, the procurement agency that acts as the barrier between the 
donor and recipient families. This is done in part out of respect for the donor family, but 
it nonetheless establishes an emotional distance and frames the process of 
communication as a highly bureaucratic manner.  
At the same time, transplant recipients are encouraged to view their new organ as 
the “gift of life,” setting up the expectation that surgery will effect a state of renewal. 
More importantly for the medical establishment, the idea of the “gift” works to instils in 
recipients a deep sense of responsibility, encouraging compliance with one’s medication 
and required hospital visits post-transplant (Dickinson). As Marcel Mauss points out in 
The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies: “In theory... gifts are 
voluntary but in fact they are given and repaid under obligation” (1). For those who 
receive the new organs as a result of a disease which has been brought about by anti-
longevity lifestyle habits such as alcohol abuse, the expectation is that their derelictions 
will cease and that the gift recipient will live differently in order that the new organs are 
not harmed.  
While the process of transplantation effects enormous good and has saved over 
half a million lives, this simplistic metaphor ignores the reality that surgery does not 
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return bodies to some pre-illness, pristine state of health; instead, it exchanges a 
terminal condition, organ failure, for a chronic condition, one that requires receipts to 
take immunosuppressant drugs for the rest of their lives and have numerous hospital 
visits post-surgery. Depending on the cause of organ failure, many patients experience a 
recurrence of symptoms or organ rejection and have to undergo the process of 
transplantation yet again (Medscape). Nonetheless, it is difficult to give voice to aspects 
of transplantation which are considered too negative to raise in public – such as the 
element of on-going physical suffering, or the fact that the infection/rejection paradox 
that is central to transplantation has not been solved. Organ recipients have 
documented a compulsion to voice the positive, largely because doing otherwise feels 
like an act of ingratitude and provokes shame.  A liver transplant recipient named 
Richard McCann experienced this first-hand:  
“I used to go to a transplant support group . . . but even there I became aware that 
there were ways you were supposed to talk about the transplant that were 
acceptable and ways that were considered a little too dark. And as long as you 
were on the page of, "Yes, sir, my donor gave me my gift of life," you were doing 
great. But if you strayed into less well-illuminated territory . . . then the 
transplant support group was a little more urging you to quiet down” (McCann & 
Gibson). 
 
With such issues in mind, this thesis seeks to expand the discourse from the 
organ seen as a medicalized, instrumentalized object or a “gift of life” to one that is the 
site of conflicting, evolving, and shifting meanings. The complicated narrative inspiring 
this endeavor is Richard McCann’s short non-fiction piece entitled “The 
Resurrectionist,” a story published in 2000 which details the plain realities of his liver 
transplant experience. His piece was the catalyst for my project and search for counter-
narratives.  
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"Here's what happened," McCann writes in a matter-of-fact manner at the outset 
of his piece (McCann 1). "I was cut apart. The liver of a dead person was put in me so I 
might live again" (1). His opening lines makes the reader face the stark facts without the 
veneer: he is alive; another person is dead. Frankly and boldly, he writes against a 
language of transplantation that obscures this reality. His frustration and desire not to 
quiet down and instead to speak openly about the less illuminated territories of 
transplant and the interdependence of life and death inherent to the process are evident 
throughout his brave essay. In a straightforward manner, he communicates the shadow 
side of transplant—the areas that many transplant professionals are reluctant to 
discuss—and tells them simply: stop hiding. 
In the compelling pages that follow, McCann describes his struggle with liver 
failure. He recalls the physically and psychologically excruciating wait for the new organ 
that would return him to the world of the living. And he reflects on how his body—and 
especially his view of it—changed after surgery. Now he was "made . . . of something 
rescued from the graveyard" (4). 
His piece shows that discussions on the morbidity and boundary crossing 
associated with transplantation have not disappeared despite attempts to normalize the 
process through unemotional, technical language or through the use of the pervading 
“gift of life” metaphor to induce compliance both with the medical regime and the 
restitution narrative. These conversations have instead gone underground, and McCann 
crosses yet another boundary by voicing them openly. 
Unlike the multitude of first-person narratives that one finds on transplantation 
websites, the simplified tales of renewal, McCann's narrative examines and critiques 
those very conventions of storytelling. While he wanted the transplantation to be a 
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happy ending, it was not. There was no temporary break and eventual resumption of 
normative life because he became ill again: "The story wasn't over" (10). His body and 
his story resist the convention of recovery and resolution that narrative often confers on 
the experience of illness, increasing the suffering of those who are unable to recover.  
His reality is that he has continued to struggle with the disease that led to his 
liver's failure. For many who receive transplants, illness recurs or the body rejects the 
new organ. These common developments clash with the story of “a happy ending thanks 
to the miracle of medicine,” and organ recipients often suffer not only the recurrence of 
illness but also a heavy burden of guilt for having rejected what had been given to them 
by a grieving family, the opportunity to keep alive some part of someone who had died. 
Even if a person does recover after organ transplantation surgery, McCann’s 
essay also speaks to the fact that a person’s narrative will be inevitably altered, utterly, 
from the experience of receiving another person’s organ. These difficulties are often 
obscured because, as McCann acknowledges, complaining about having received the 
“gift of life” feels shameful. Nonetheless, it is natural. Transplant recipients go on 
immunosuppressive drugs, which are highly toxic, for the rest of their lives. They trade 
in imminent death for—as time goes on—a series of simultaneously more manageable 
and more life-threatening conditions. This is not an easy path. 
Importantly, this threat manifests not only physiologically but also 
psychologically. McCann's narrative interrogates the logic—driven by the need for 
organs and by biomedical discourse's tendency to reduce people to physiology and 
disease states—that separates organs from bodies, presenting them as parts necessary 
for repairs "that one could airlift a great distance in an Igloo cooler marked HUMAN 
HEART or HUMAN EYES" (5). He protests this commodification of the body by 
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conjuring up the distinct identity of the donor and his/her place within a social network. 
McCann connects the guilt he feels about taking something so precious from this fully 
imagined donor to the seriousness of his own bodily need, describing in detail what he 
suffered psychologically as he edged toward death from liver failure. While he fully 
comprehends that he is in no way responsible for that death, the awareness of the loss 
that is necessary for him to live still appears to trouble and destabilize him, requiring 
constant adjustment to his thinking.  
On a microcosmic scale, McCann’s essay highlights the myriad complex, often 
unspoken concerns raised by the process of organ transplantation. In essence, his 
piece—in addition to the other works I examine—represents the “return of the 
repressed:” a push-back to the detached and mechanical presentation of transplantation 
by the medical industrial complex. 
Chapter 1 explores the connections between organ transplantation, race and 
exploitation. The texts I engage with in this chapter include “The Black Hand,” a 1931 
short story by Charles Gardner Bowers as well as Kazuo Ishiguro’s more recent novel 
Never Let Me Go.  Though they are both fictional works, I argue that they are complex 
vehicles of human expression that subtly articulate cultural truths about organ 
transplantation’s history of and—continued entanglement with—the exploitation of 
marginalized minority groups. 
Chapter 2 shifts focus to Jean-Luc Nancy's L'Intrus (The Intruder), an 
autobiographical account of his lived experience with heart transplantation and an 
interrogation of the technology of organ transfer published in the year 2000. Nancy 
utilizes gothic elements, the chaos narrative frame, and the metaphor of the intruder to 
paint a picture of the darker side of the transplant experience: the disruption, pain, and 
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forced passivity of medical intrusion. I argue that though his narrative is not uplifting, in 
its honesty, it may serve to validate the experiences of people who suffer in a similar 
manner yet feel the need to hide such sentiments.  
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Chapter 1: Organ Transplantation, Race, and Exploitation in “The Black Hand” and 
Never Let Me Go 
 
 
“Is it possible to live without feasting on death?” 
                                                        – Walker Percy 
 
 
 
Cosmas and Damian Graft the Leg of a Moor onto Stump of an Amputee, 
Jaume Huguet (1415–92) / Santa Maria of Egara in Terrassa, Barcelona, 
Spain, Index / The Bridgeman Art Library 
Stories of the successful magical replacement of lost tissues are found in the 
themes of folklore from all parts of the ancient world. Although such fantastical 
accounts were common across many different lands and cultures, the tales of Christian 
involvement in tissue replacement are well known and frequently referenced in modern 
scientific journals that document that long history of transplantation.  Depicted above is 
a painting of one such fabled endeavor. The Saints Cosmas and Damian were reputedly 
born in Asia Minor in the 3rd Century. The twin brothers became physicians devoted to 
the care of the poor and were famed for their miraculous feats of healing, which they 
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performed for no fee in adherence with their Christian faith. 
According to The Golden Legend, dated 1260, by Jacobus de Voragine, one of the 
most famous “miracles” attributed posthumously to the saints was a surgical operation 
known as “The Miracle of the Black Leg” (196). The Saints Cosmas and Damian removed 
the gangrenous limb of a white servant of the church and replaced it with the limb of a 
Moor, a Muslim of mixed Berber and Arab descent inhabiting north-western Africa, who 
had recently been buried in the cemetery of St. Peter. In the right foreground of the 
painting, the diseased white leg is cast off to the side of the sickbed, marred by pox and 
blood trickling from the stump. Relegated to the right, uppermost corner of the image, 
there is an inset of Cosmas and Damian harvesting the healthy leg from a naked black 
body. Marking the tension over the crossing of corporeal borders of difference and 
haunting the larger depiction of this so-called “miracle” is an easily overlooked image of 
what one commentator has called “a body in service, plundered” (Trethewey 11). 
Today, this painting is regarded as the first pictorial representation of a 
transplant in history, and over 61 different iterations of it have been created between the 
thirteenth and the nineteenth century. While the painting and its accompanying story 
are often used in medical journals as an interesting anecdote about the long, strange 
history of transplantation, never are these scholarly articles oriented toward the 
question: whom was this limb taken from? (Coulehan 1). The story lying beneath the 
surface, the story of racial exploitation, is either entirely effaced (“They then surgically 
replaced it with the leg of another person who had died that same day”) or simply 
ignored to focus on the so-called miracle. Yet grafted onto the image is a metaphorical 
account of the history of race and power. Even in death, a black body is relegated to the 
service of a white body. 
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I use this piece as a means of introducing the questions of race and justice that 
are rooted even in legends of transplantation, long before the processes’ medical reality. 
Just as the racial elements of “The Miracle of the Black Leg” have largely been erased, 
both immunologically and culturally, the work of transplantation and organ transfer 
also involves a strange forgetting or erasure. Since the onset of immunosuppressant 
drugs in the cyclosporine era, recipients’ bodies can be temporarily pharmacologically 
re-coded so that they do not recognize or attack foreign tissues.  This pharmaceutical 
work is accompanied by cultural labor: language—metaphors in particular—is harnessed 
to domesticate the radical otherness of the tissue and normalizes the transplant process. 
Metaphors reclassify a complex, highly bureaucratic and scientific process in ways that 
make it more culturally acceptable (Lakoff & Johnson 3).  One of the influential 
metaphors utilized to do just that includes the idea of the body as a machine. Instead of 
being laden with moral questions, the process of transplanting an organ is divested of its 
emotional weight and depersonalized, severing its ties to a donor and his network of 
loved ones; it becomes about replacing a part fitted to carry out a particular function in 
broken down machine, just like with a car.  
In his critique of the “cold metaphors” dominating American legal 
representations of the human body, Alan Hyde argues that common to this metaphor 
are notions of bodily “fungibility, estrangement, and desentimentalization” (47).  Such a 
framework problematically gives credence to the belief that a failing organ can be 
replaced without significant disturbance to corporeal unity. It fails to acknowledge the 
symbolic meaning that certain organs like the heart possess and the reality that human 
organs cannot be ordered from the factory just like car parts. Nonetheless, the idea of 
the body as a machine is a useful concept for promoting the donation process. Tied to 
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this idea of the body of a machine is the concept of salvaging. The term "salvage," from 
the Latin salvire," to save," is often used to describe what is done with parts of a broken 
down machine. This concept feeds into the transplantation processes’ normalization by 
framing the practice of taking organs from one person and implanting them into 
another in a positive light: the part is a resource being taken to be put to use (saved) 
rather than wasted. Thus, a key rhetorical function of this metaphor is to make the 
refusal to donate seem both selfish and irresponsible and the fear of receiving altogether 
irrational. 
Coexisting with the metaphor of the body as a machine are the related 
conceptions of organs as “the gift of life” and tissues as vegetation in need of 
“harvesting.” Agricultural imagery abounds in all domains of organ transfer, 
representing what anthropologist Lesley Sharpe calls the “systematic greening of the 
body” (Sharpe 15). Both these metaphors work together to inspire images of renewal 
and rebirth rather than those of extraction or decay. Viewed from this perspective, 
transplantation not only saves the recipient’s life, but it also restores health. As a 
parallel process to the body’s regaining a lost function, the recipient of an organ—
analogically—is framed as regaining his or her lost life. These metaphors work to 
naturalize the highly artificial processes of procurement surgery by invoking such 
imagery; just as nature renews itself, so does the human body. There are even 
automobile bumper stickers promoting organ donation that encourage people to 
“recycle” themselves (catastrophic car accidents are themselves a fertile source of 
potential donors). The need for sophisticated medical techniques and a multilayered 
industry of interdependent parts encompassing an incredibly extensive and indeed 
international infrastructure for organ procurement and implantation are left out. 
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Framed in this manner, the risks that accompany transplantation, the hardships of 
living with a transplant, and the ever-present possibility that the organ will cease to 
function tend to be relegated to the background (Sharp 110–23).  
The metaphors of transplantation constitute a form of cultural work that helps 
reclassify body parts to enable their redeployment. As I have suggested, these metaphors 
are problematic because they place a complex process under a single umbrella and mask 
the troubling and emotionally charged aspects of the transplantation process. They have 
been utilized to disentangle the transplantation process from its decidedly mixed history 
and to cleanse or disconnect organs from the human freight of their original owners. 
The “troubling” and effaced element of transplantation I have chosen to focus on is the 
processes’ racial history.  
Organ transplantation materially reconfigures the biological boundaries between 
bodies, but it also reshapes the social and ethical possibilities of using certain bodies, 
namely those of minority groups, as commodities to feed the lives of racially privileged 
groups. While medical accounts of the history of transplantation, even in the use of 
legends, have largely been purged of their racial currents, literature has not. Organ 
transplantation is a staple of gothic science fiction and dystopian works as it captures a 
scientific imaginary where the borders between life and death are blurred and where life 
is extended for some, while vulnerable others are exploited (largely for their organs). It 
renders visible medicine’s role in instantiating embodied systems of inequality and 
violence, and therefore often figures in science fiction to highlight how medicine 
implements and reinforces colonial hierarchies of race. In this chapter, I argue that 
gothic science fiction works such as Charles Gardner Bowers’ 1931 short story “The 
Black Hand” and Kazuo Ishiguro’s dystopian novel 2005 Never Let Me Go are complex 
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vehicles of human expression that subtly articulate cultural truths about organ 
transplantation’s history of entanglement with racial exploitation. Most medical 
journals that have attempted to engaged with these works of literature have either 
mocked them for their “sensationalism” or disparaged them for provoking fear and 
encouraging donor reluctance, especially from minority groups. While I recognize that 
such stories may be damaging to the public’s perception of the transplant industry, I 
hope to demonstrate that these narratives of organ transfer, though fictional and not 
based on real cases, are nonetheless useful in raising racial issues rooted in the actual 
history and modern realities of organ transplantation.  
Nor are their fantasies of predation entirely unfounded. In fact, one of the first 
heart transplants ever performed in the United States involved the harvest of a heart 
from an African-American man named Bruce Tucker without familial consent and its 
transplantation into a white recipient. This event sparked racial controversy over who 
would benefit from this new kind of high-tech medicine and whose bodies would make it 
possible for them to do so (Dempsey). The texts with which I engage resist the dominant 
metaphors and trends in medical transplant commentary, which efface or downplay 
organ transplantation’s strangeness and racially-charged history. Instead, they actively 
dwell on the uncanniness of the transfer process; as such, they serve as a useful 
mechanism for resurrecting past racial abuses in the transplantation process and 
illuminating current ones, such as the expansion of illegal organ trafficking which 
“follows the modern routes of capital: from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from 
black and brown to white” (Scheper-Hughes 31-42).  
The gothic science fiction mode is particularly useful in examining the 
relationship between organ transplantation and race because of science fiction’s 
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engagement with futuristic technologies and the gothic’s common preoccupation with 
the Other and aspects of Otherness. Writers of science fiction have helped prepare 
people for the extraordinary advances in biomedical technology—such as organ 
transplantation, cybernetic organisms, and cloning—by imagining what those 
technologies would be like and by speculating about the ethical issues and social 
changes they would evoke. By tapping into racial discourse, gothic tales, marked by their 
“transgression, excess, ambiguity, sensationalism, non-rationality and terror,” have 
been particularly useful; “tales of terror, fear, and mystery,” writes Michel Foucault in 
Society Must Be Defended, are intrinsically political: “at once. . . they are always about 
the abuse of power and exactions” (Botting 1; 211).  
The 1931 short story “The Black Hand,” written by Charles Gardner Bowers, is a 
gothic science fiction work featured in Amazing Stories, the first American magazine 
devoted solely to proliferation of science fiction. While it does not feature ruined castles 
or decaying aristocratic dynasties that were utilized by early European Gothic writers 
such as Horace Walpole and Anne Radcliffe, it evokes a sense of terror and betrays 
strong “anxieties over the transgression of cultural limits and boundaries,” both racial 
and bodily ones, that are hallmarks of the gothic mode (Botting 2). The story features a 
white artist who develops gangrene in his injured arm and agrees to purchase the hand 
of an African-American prisoner sentenced to death. Thus, the life or functional capacity 
of the white elite is extended while a vulnerable minority, specifically an African-
American, is commodified and exploited for his body parts. Bower’s piece overall 
captures a scientific imaginary where the borders between two bodies as well as two 
races are blurred; the biotechnological intervention highlighted in the story offers a 
different mode of thinking about what it means to work across race, class and embodied 
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division and evokes the violence that has historically facilitated so-called medical 
progress.  
“The Black Hand” begins with a tense exchange between an artist and his doctor. 
The patient is a well-connected and socially elevated white painter named Van Puyster 
who learns he must have his infected hand amputated if he wants to survive. Desperate 
for another option, he pleads with Dr. Evans telling him, “What good’s my life without 
my arm?” (Bowers 909). His whole identity is tied to being an artist—so much so that he 
can envision living without a leg or any other part of his body so long as he retains the 
use of his hand. Faced with amputation, he is given another choice: a hand transplant 
which has never been performed and that requires the butchering of another human 
being. As an aside, the doctor casually notes that the hand will come from a black 
criminal, a man who is never named.  
In a glory-seeking manner reminiscent of Mary Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein, Dr. 
Evans advocates for an operation that the recipient initially resists—in fact Van Puyster 
feels a sense of disgust specifically grounded on race—yet thinks little of the operation’s 
aftermath. Desiring “the honor of being the first to accomplish [the] operation,” Dr. 
Evans demands swift action (Bowers 910). As an artist, Van Puyster is especially 
sensitive to the visual impact of the surgery on his physical appearance. He thinks not of 
the specific man who will die to supply him with a new body part, but rather of the 
larger racial stereotypes that his society has perpetuated. The thought of racial 
intermixing is “almost overpowering” to his aesthetic mind (Bowers 911). He even tries 
to imagine what the size of the hand will be and obsesses over whether it will be “black 
or only a light mulatto,” letting his mind run wild imagining the social implications of 
the transgressive procedure (Bowers 911).  Nonetheless, Van Puyster agrees to purchase 
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the arm of a black man sentenced to die in a state prison because while the thought of a 
black hand was “revolting,” the thought of no hand at all was “like death itself” (Bowers 
911).  
During the surgery, which is described meticulously, the doctor notes that the 
hand “fitted perfectly” and takes pride in the fact that he will receive the credit for 
performing such a novel and complex surgery (Bowers 923), Physically, he writes that 
Van Puyster’s new hand healed nicely and that “complete sensation had returned.” 
There was no biological rejection of the foreign tissue—even the blood types were 
matched perfectly, leaving no physiological basis for a problem (Bowers 923).  
What Van Puyster’s doctor neglects is the powerful psychological rejection of the 
newly grafted flesh that will rapidly be realized. While he continues painting 
masterpieces, the artist cannot bear to look at himself without gloves on. He begins 
developing an even greater aversion to blacks—he cannot bear to even be around them 
or see them on the streets, so much so that he turns inward and begins to lead a solitary 
existence. Even the paintings he produces with the new hand are altered, as if 
possessing the hand of a racial other, one that was acquired violently, impacts the 
creation of his work; though they are described as “more marvelous pictures than ever” 
they have become more fantastical and grotesque, mirroring the alteration in Van 
Puyster’s mindset and conduct. This narrative element subtly challenges the premise 
that consciousness and the body can be divorced, an assumption central to the 
contemporary Western transplantation process.  
To date, real-life tissue transplantation technologies have tended to reinforce the 
idea that identity can be reduced to the higher brain: Donald Joralemon notes that 
“transplantation surgeries contribute to conceptions of the body as a collection of 
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replaceable parts and of the self as distinct from all but its neural locus.” Fictions like 
“The Black Hand,” which connect consciousness with tissue other than that governing 
higher brain functions, offer a subversive alternative vision of the intersection between 
body and mind.  
 Eventually, Van Puyster’s case history documents the violent consequences of his 
psychological rejection: he goes on to savagely murder a number of African-Americans 
and by story’s end he is committed to a “Psychopathic Hospital.” The preferred narrative 
of transplantation is one of success, medical triumph and technical dexterity, yet Van 
Puyster’s experience entailed disruptions of self-identity and bodily integrity, disproving 
the body-as-machine metaphor. He began to be tormented by hallucinations and 
imagined that he was being pursued by a black man who was attempting to lop off his 
hand; his vision in some ways came to life.  
Van Puyster is never really able to integrate the new hand as his own—it retained 
vestiges of the racial “other” that went beyond the hand’s external pigmentation. Just as 
surgeons made the decision to amputate his right arm above the region of the graft, Van 
Puyster is found bleeding to death in his cell from a slashing wound to his white arm. 
While the case is ultimately judged as a suicide—the patient became “criminally insane 
following a graft of a black hand”—the story possesses a lingering suggestion that the 
slash wound to Van Puyster’s white arm, committed by his grafted black hand, was an 
act of reclaiming made by the black man whose hand was taken (Bowers 923). 
In many ways, this ending and Bower’s story overall participate in the 
perpetuation of racial stereotypes, associating the only African-American character with 
aggression and criminality. Racism entails the demonization of difference, a divorcing 
from what is aligned with the category of humanity; that is precisely what is done to Van 
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Puyster’s donor. While all the white people in the story are provided with names, the 
African-American singled out to provide body parts for Van Puyster is simply referred to 
as the “condemned criminal” or “the negro.” Because of the donor’s criminal 
background and racial identity, the doctor even believes he has rendered the man’s 
“doomed existence” meaningful by allocating his body parts in the service of a white 
man. Thus, transplantation becomes a corrective that converts a social deviant into a 
“useful” member of society. 
The presentation of the transplantation process itself also draws from a racist 
discourse. Organ transplantation challenges understandings of the boundaries of the 
body, showing that the self does not end at the skin but rather comes into being in 
contact with others. In Bower’s story, the crucial line of difference crossed is one of race. 
Bower represents the outcomes of the transplant procedure as horrid, resulting in 
psychological trauma as well as outbreaks of violence. Van Puyster comes to exemplify 
what French diplomat and racial theorist Arthur de Gobineau has called “the horror 
excited by the possibility of infinite intermixture.”  Despite the surgery’s technical 
perfection, the racial hybrid that emerges is represented as monstrous, living evidence 
of a “treacherous” liaison between hierarchically stratified ethnicities (Bowers 911). 
Therefore, “The Black Hand” reveals and exacerbates white anxieties about racial 
hybridity and, because of the nature of Van Puyster’s demise,  the possibility of racial 
uprising.  
Nevertheless, the text as a whole does more than simply feed racial stereotypes 
and prejudices. “The Black Hand” portrays donor and recipient bodies as the sites 
through which historical social injustices and violence can be visualized. Through its 
sensational plot, the story underscores the exploitation and racism that devalues a black 
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life and makes black bodies mere fodder for the preservation of whites like Van Puyster. 
It is not simply a sensational story. It highlights a resurgent ethical problem in which 
minorities, namely African-Americans, and their bodies have historically been used as 
parts for white and often socio-economically powerful people. One of the most troubling 
consequences of the metaphors used to naturalize organ transplantation is that they 
make it easier to avoid recognizing the inequalities that have made possible the 
advancement of medical procedures. Disentanglement and protocols requiring 
anonymity try to cleanse an object of the human freight of its original owner/producers, 
but in Van Puyster’s case the process is inevitably incomplete; the African-American 
donor’s fantastical post-death presence can be interpreted as a refusal to be silenced by 
the medical practitioner and patient who organized his murder. Karl Marx’s theory of 
commodity fetishism offers a metaphor for that incompleteness. Alienation of any 
object—severing it from its original context and classifying it in new ways that enable it 
to be transacted—leaves a remnant of strange “life” in the alienated object: ghostly 
traces of the labor and the relations of production that enabled its manufacture (48).  
Written in the 1930s, Bower’s story as a whole serves a similar function, in that it 
both anticipates the racially charged aspects of actual transplants performed in the 
1960s, when political writers and academics like Ali Mazrui feared that African 
American bodies would become “spare parts” for white people, and serves to remind 
current readers of a racial history that has been largely forgotten. Western medicine has 
historically built its practices upon bodies of color—from J. Marion Sims, the “father of 
modern gynecology,” who developed the first pelvic speculum through acts of brutal un-
anaesthetized surgery upon enslaved African-American women, to the bioethical 
travesties of the Tuskegee syphilis experiments and the Johns Hopkins: Kennedy 
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Krieger Institute’s lead paint experiments, racism is undoubtedly embedded into the 
very foundations of medicine itself.1  
Organ transplantation constitutes only a small part of the abuse and exploitation 
endured by African-Americans at the hands of the medical establishment, but it is an 
important part of history that science fiction works like “The Black Hand” harken to. 
While there are many stories to choose from, the real life transplantation that 
undoubtedly parallels Bower’s story most is that of the African-American man Bruce 
Tucker. 
From its inception, the American experience with heart transplantation was 
haunted by the specter of exploitation and inequality, dogged by questions of who 
should receive the “gift of life,” and colored by ethnic politics. Until the enforcement of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, hospitals in the American South remained segregated. In 
Arkansas and Louisiana, blood banks were required by law to label blood by the race of 
the donor (“Caucasoid,” “Negroid,” and “Mongoloid”) and to obtain explicit written 
permission from the recipient for crossing the color line in transfusion. In 1968, only 
four years after the passage of historic civil rights legislation, race remained a critical 
issue in American medicine. The harvest of a heart from an African American man 
named Bruce Tucker and its transplantation into a white recipient ignited new 
controversy over who would benefit from this new kind of high-tech medicine and 
whose bodies would make it possible for them to do so (Wailoo 144). 
The surgery was performed in May 1968 at the Medical College of Virginia 
																																																						
1 Harriet A. Washington’s Medical Apartheid:The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black 
Americans outlines, in depth, the history of abuse and exploitation of African American by a racist 
medical establishment. This history, she argues, goes far beyond the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study, in 
which African-American sharecroppers, under the sponsorship of the United States Public Health Service, 
were for 40 years subjected to various procedures and prevented from getting penicillin treatment. 
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(MCV); at the time it was the tenth heart transplant ever performed in the United States. 
Surgeons removed the heart from the body of a severely brain-damaged fifty-four-year-
old man and placed it in the chest of a fifty-three-year-old man. Amid the intense media 
interest in heart transplantation, officials from MCV did not initially identify either the 
donor or the recipient (144). But on May 28, 1968, a reporter from the Washington Post 
labeled the MCV surgery as the first American interracial transplant: a Virginia “white” 
received a “Negro's heart” in a Richmond hospital. Although Joseph Klett, the retired 
white businessman who received Bruce Tucker's heart, lived only seven days before 
dying from massive organ rejection, the story surrounding Tucker's heart lived on. It 
became the focus of a lawsuit, an eventual judicial decision about the nature and 
determination of brain death, and a spur to legislatures to craft new statutes for defining 
death. As the first legal case in the United States to challenge the conventional 
“definition of death” in the context of heart transplantation, citations to Tucker v. Lower 
appeared (and continue to appear) frequently in the bioethics literature. But a curious 
thing happened in many of these discussions; the issue of race disappeared. Yet the fact 
that the heart of an African American man was removed and placed into the chest of a 
white man was not incidental in 1968, in Richmond, and to members of Bruce Tucker's 
family (145). 
Tucker had been declared “unclaimed dead,” which would have made his body, 
under Virginia state law, available for medical use after twenty-four hours. After a 
severe fall onto concrete, Tucker was brought by ambulance to MCV. He was 
unconscious, and alone. Many of the facts of what happened remain in dispute, but it 
appears that no attempt was made by the hospital to contact his family. The members of 
Bruce Tucker's family were not consulted about the decision to remove his heart and 
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kidneys. The family was not informed that Tucker had been declared one of the 
“unclaimed dead.” Tucker's brothers, William and Grover Tucker, had called the 
hospital three times seeking information, and only later did they discover their brother's 
role in transplant history from the undertaker, who received the body for burial. The 
surviving Tuckers were especially distressed not only by the identification of their loved 
one as “unclaimed” but by how quickly his status mutated from dead person to 
“unclaimed dead.” African Americans had long-standing and well-justified fears about 
the medical appropriation of black corpses. In fact, Virginia law required a twenty-four-
hour waiting period for family or friends to come forward to claim a deceased loved one 
before he or she could be declared unclaimed. Amid the exigencies of the transplant 
race, however, surgeons disregarded the waiting period because such a delay would have 
made Tucker's organs unusable for transplant. In Richmond, the surgeons were eager 
for their opportunity to take part in this emergent transplant enterprise. Thus, within 
one hour of the state medical examiner's pronouncement that he was “unclaimed dead,” 
surgeons made the incision into his chest to remove his heart (145). 
Angered by these events, the Tucker family hired a young African-American 
lawyer, L. Douglas Wilder, and brought two lawsuits, one against the surgeons and one 
against the coroner. MCV surgeons ultimately maintained that race played no role in the 
decision to take Tucker's heart; the transplant, they insisted, would have proceeded in 
an identical fashion if a middle-class white man had been brought to the hospital in a 
similar brain-damaged state. The Tucker family ultimately lost both cases, but attorney 
Douglas Wilder’s statements had power despite the outcome. He explicitly identified 
race as a critical issue in the MCV heart transplant. A person accorded higher status in 
the community, charged Wilder, would not have been treated in the manner accorded 
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Bruce Tucker. The hospital “pulled the plug because he was poor and black, a 
representative of the faceless masses. They're not going to be taking the hearts of any 
white mayors. You know whose hearts they're going to be taking” (Lederer 172). 
In many ways, Bower’s story parallels the actual experience of Bruce Tucker; both 
stories reveal what can be interpreted as acts of violence towards the society’s most 
vulnerable and the uneven distributions of wealth and power that allow for the 
extraction of life-force from the bodies of and body parts of minorities. Unfortunately, 
Tucker’s story was not even an isolated event. In that same year in South Africa, 
Barnaard transplanted the heart of Clive Haupt, a Cape man of mixed racial ancestry, 
into Philip Blaiberg, a white South African dentist (Wailoo 149). The racial overtones of 
the story, particularly given South Africa’s apartheid state, spawned much commentary: 
“Haupt’s heart will go literally to hundreds of places where Haupt himself could not go 
because his skin was a little darker than that of Blaiberg” (Johnson). 
Thus, far from simply being a sensational and ridiculous tale as it has frequently 
been framed by medical professionals, today Bower’s short story can be read as an 
attempt to return repressed histories of violence to the forefront and to unveil cultural 
truths about the transplantation process’ history of abuses against minorities, exposing 
the contradiction of modern technologies of care which, in the case of organ 
transplantation, save lives but have previously rendered minority populations 
disposable. While the story does provoke fear and is likely damaging for transplant 
centers from a public relations standpoint, history shows that fear on the part of 
minorities about medical procedures is far from unfounded and far from subsiding. 
Scientific studies have even shown that the legacy of Tuskegee, when doctors in 
Alabama purposely withheld treatment from poor African-American men with syphilis 
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from 1932 to 1972, continues to play an important factor in the extremely low 
participation of blacks in medical clinical trials, preventative health care, and organ 
donation efforts.  Organ bank workers say that “fear is common, especially among 
blacks who mistrust the medical system—largely because of the federal government’s 
secret Tuskegee syphilis experiments on black men” (Rosenfeld 181). Fear of the medical 
establishment and organ donation persists despite the efforts to normalize the 
procedure and purge it of its history of inequality. Therefore, rather than simply 
dismissing gothic science fiction works like “The Black Hand,” the medical 
establishment may find it more fruitful to acknowledge historical realities, make sense 
of these stories from a literary perspective, and find ways of rendering them useful. 
Another reason to do so is that since Bower’s 1931 short story, organ 
transplantation narratives’ association with the gothic science fiction genre has 
persisted. While Bower’s story anticipated the transplantation process’ ties to abuses 
against minorities since the first successful transplant in the 1950s, twenty-first century 
novels like Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go unveil continued problems with what is 
now a “standard” medical procedure. It is easy to read Kazuo Ishiguro’s chilling work 
Never Let Me Go as an indictment of human cloning, but it can also be understood as a 
novel that deals with the abuses of medicine and the medical sciences, specifically 
against a marginalized subclass. In a story complete with clones, sinister organ donation 
centers, and doomed romance, I argue that Ishiguro’s dystopian novel draws a subtle 
analogy between the lives of clones created for the harvesting of their organs and real 
marginalized minority groups so desperately poor that they sell their own body parts. 
Never Let Me Go imagines a society where human copies are brought into the world and 
raised in seclusion. When fully grown, they begin to give up their organs for the benefit 
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of the “normal” human population, until they “complete,” the novel’s euphemism for 
death.  
Despite appearing post-racial, I hope to demonstrate that the world of this novel 
is saturated in racialized forms of discrimination that both harken to past atrocities and 
evoke the modern and very real racialized trade in organs for transplantation, where 
human organs are illegally bought by international clientele in the West from 
impoverished minorities in countries such as China, Turkey, Iraq, South Africa, and 
Brazil (Scheper-Hughes 31). In these parts of the world, Ishiguro’s dystopia draws on 
today’s reality, as desperation on the part of affluent and gravely ill patients is fed by 
desperation on the part of society’s most vulnerable people. Ishiguro’s work displays the 
ways in which such atrocities can become normalized, hidden in the routines of daily 
life. In this way, the novel serves as a subversive story contesting the accepted narrative 
of progress and altruism communicated by transplant networks and society at large, 
which turn a blind eye towards organ transplantation’s grimmer realities and the 
procedure’s continued links with the exploitation of minority groups. The workings of 
biopolitical racism – the stratification of people into masters and servants – are as 
subtle and inescapable in Ishiguro’s novel as they are in real life.  
Ishiguro explores the nature of this brutal, systemic atrocity through the voice of 
Kathy H., a young woman raised in an exclusive boarding school for cloned children 
called Hailsham who looks back on her upbringing. At Hailsham, students are “told but 
not told” about their ultimate fate and purpose in the world. Her narrative is in some 
ways a quest for truth in a world where as she says little is “actually . . . talked about in 
the open”, and where the protectiveness of the school’s “guardians,” the ignorance of her 
peers, and the mendaciousness of her friend Ruth all conspire with her own memory 
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and faulty knowledge to obscure her own real story. As Kathy’s tale progresses, readers 
go on a journey with her, gradually realizing something is profoundly amiss. Parents – 
or the lack thereof – are never mentioned, the students live in the school from infancy, 
and they never leave the grounds. All the students have oddly truncated names like 
Reggie D. and Alice B. Kathy H. describes the experience of growing up and 
progressively becoming attuned to the fact that her body and the bodies of her friends 
are essentially objects owned by others, destined to be disassembled and consumed by 
them. Her name is truncated, like her life. This horrifying world is described almost in 
passing, as an afterthought. Kathy H.'s flat tone never wavers for a moment, even when 
she uses the jargon of caring, donation, and completion. The more one learns about this 
underclass of organ donors, the more disturbing the casual blandness of Kathy H.'s 
voice becomes.  
Ishiguro's emphasis on the cloned body raises a number of questions, related not 
just to the unsettled category of “the human” in an age of advanced biotechnology and 
commodity culture, but also more specifically with the position of the marginalized 
Others within society.  In this dystopia, the clones are a stigmatized subpopulation 
whose bodies are exploited—broken down and disabled through a series of donations 
until they die before they are thirty. The caregiving is provided by other donor clones 
who, ironically, nurse their peers only to keep them alive long enough to make 
additional, ultimately fatal donations. The “carer donors” themselves must eventually 
enter the vicious and terminal cycle. In Ishiguro’s novel, then, the Ethics of Care is 
turned on its head: disability is allocated to “clones” in order to repair “normals”; the 
donor clones who readers come to respect and even admire are exploited and sacrificed. 
The fantastic trope of clones fully capable of feeling, thinking, and narrating—that are 
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effectively undistinguishable from "real" humans but nevertheless accorded a distinctly 
subordinate and subhuman status—evokes fundamental notions of the discrimination 
against and persecution of particular social groups and “othered” bodies.  
From the start of the novel, readers slowly start to understand that there is an 
insurmountable difference between the clones and the “normal” humans. The clones are 
never described in terms of ethnicity, yet they "were different from [their] guardians, 
from the people outside," in a way the narrative makes difficult to pin down. Ishiguro 
deliberately characterizes his main characters, the Hailsham students, as clones—
biologically identical to “normals”—making clear that their categorization as “other,” a 
distinct species-being whose tissues exist literally to extend the lives of others, is 
primarily socially constructed. The continuation of the donation program is enabled by 
the symbiotic forces of social denial and biopolitical racism. Biopower, as defined by 
Michel Foucault, is a force that concerns itself with "the administration of bodies and 
the calculated management of life" (140). In other words, biopower is a force that 
concerns itself with the control of populations and their stability and productivity. 
Racism, in biopolitical terms, is the division of groups to determine higher and lower 
"races"; the higher race being the protected and privileged population. Charles Mills' 
Racial Contract is an example of this hierarchical evaluation of races, using "white" as 
the privileged race and "nonwhite" as the subordinate race: "the general purpose of the 
Contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a group with respect to the 
nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land and resources, and the 
denial of equal socio-economic opportunities to them" (Mills 11).  
The Racial Contract applies especially to the clones in terms of the exploitation of 
their bodies, but also to the denial of their social opportunities.  Visible in the ways in 
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which they are addressed (students, donors or creatures), behaved towards (people 
shudder at the very thought of them) and the purpose for which they are ultimately 
conceived (the donation of organs for the ‘normal’ population), the dehumanization of 
the clones is a process that continues to be exposed throughout the novel. Thus, despite 
the apparent absence of race, the idea of racial difference nevertheless emerges in the 
predetermined roles that the genetically differentiated clones fulfill. In a world that 
appears to be without race, forms of racism persist, and the novel reveals the 
continuance of racial thought and racism in a post-racial era through the medical 
exploitation of clones.  
While Ishiguro's almost archetypal symbolism allows the clones to symbolize the 
effects of all kinds of repressive and exploitative authorities, there is deeper textual 
evidence to suggest that race is one of the issues at stake. The novel focuses on the 
various points in Kathy’s childhood where she slowly comes to grasp the extent of her 
social “otherness” and the exploitation of her life. One such moment occurs when Kathy 
H. thinks of the first time she became aware of the difference between herself and 
humans, the central difference on which the entire novel is premised. She reports a 
recognition scene, a standard feature in novels about racism or other forms of 
discrimination. Early on in their school days, another clone named Ruth and her friends 
notice that Madame, a “normal” who runs the school from a distance, seems to avoid 
any direct bodily contact with the students. Trying to prove this observation, whose 
implication they cannot, at this young age, comprehend, the students plot to swarm 
toward her for fun—only to be shocked by Madame’s revulsion towards their very 
existence. Kathy recalls the scene, stating: 
“As she came to a halt, I glanced at her face—as did the others, I’m sure. 
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And I can still see it now, the shudder she seemed to be suppressing, the real 
dread that one of us would accidentally brush against her. And though we just 
kept walking, we all felt it; it was like we’d walked from the sun right into chilly 
shade. Ruth had been right: Madame was afraid of us. But she was afraid of us in 
the same way someone might be afraid of spiders. We hadn’t been ready for that. 
It had never occurred to us to wonder how we would feel, being seen like that, 
being the spiders.” (Ishiguro 32) 
 
Before Madame’s reaction, the act had merely been conceived as a blithe childhood 
dare, and “if not a joke exactly, very much a private thing we’d wanted to settle among 
ourselves,” but afterward Kathy observes “we were a very different group from the one 
that had stood about excitedly waiting for Madame to get out of her car,” and the whole 
event took on a seriousness unanticipated by the children (Ishiguro 32).  
The scene is a turning point in Kathy’s life, for she notices for the first time the 
difference between herself and others in the world. She continues, speaking of the scene 
as the moment when you realize that “you are different to them; that there are people 
out there, like Madame, who don’t hate you or wish you any harm, but who nevertheless 
shudder at the very thought of you—of how you were brought into this world and why—
and who dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs” (Ishiguro 33). The first 
time she glimpsed herself through the eyes of a “normal” is a cold moment. For Kathy it 
is like “walking past a mirror you’ve walked past every day of your life, and suddenly it 
shows you something else, something troubling and strange” (Ishiguro 33). The mirror 
scene is "troubling and strange" because of the double-vision in which she sees herself, 
not just with her own eyes and consciousness, but also with the consciousness of the 
"people out there," the "normal people outside" who inexplicably see her as different, 
even when her origins as a clone would not be immediately evident (Ishiguro 33, 63).  
Kathy’s social disillusionment in this scene is reminiscent of philosopher of 
postcolonialism Frantz Fanon’s description of realizing one’s racial alterity. Fanon 
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writes of the subject: “As long as the black child remains on his home ground his life 
follows more or less the same course as that of the white child. But if he goes to Europe 
he will have to rethink his life, for in France, his country, he will be different from the 
rest” (Fanon 126). Additionally, Fanon notes that “the black man is unaware of it as long 
as he lives among his own people; but at the first white gaze, he feels the weight of his 
melanin” (Fanon 128). When Kathy runs out to surprise Madame she feels herself 
placed under the “gaze” and comes to consciousness of her otherness. Even Miss Emily, 
the most sympathetically drawn “guardian,” or pedagogic overseer at Hailsham, 
remarks on her fear of the clones. She tells Kathy “We’re all afraid of you. I myself had 
to fight back my dread of you almost every day I was at Hailsham. There were times I’d 
look down at you all from my study window and I’d feel such revulsion” (Ishiguro 246). 
In setting up the social dynamic of fear in the relations between the clones and the rest 
of society in such a light, Ishiguro allegorizes the element of disgust involved in 
racialized otherness. Although there is no mention of race with regard to the clones in 
the novel, the clones are racialized by the outside community and are seen as 
ontologically inferior. 
Even the role of the students' education—especially the emphasis placed on their 
ability to be creative and to produce art—recalls the experience of the colonized, 
marginalized, and enslaved. At the beginning of the novel Kathy explains the young 
students' preoccupation with the arts, “Paintings, drawings, pottery; all sorts of 
'sculptures,” on which they are encouraged by their Guardians to focus their attention. 
Their creations are then sold at "Exchanges" where the work of all the students is 
displayed and bought by other students, with the best pieces being taken away for the 
mysterious Madame's "Gallery" (Ishiguro 16; 31). In her school days, Kathy reveals that 
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"how much you were liked and respected, had to do with how good you were at 
'creating'" (Ishiguro 16). The clones come to attribute great significance to their art, 
convincing themselves that it might be a qualification for getting their organ donations 
deferred because, according to Miss Emily, "things like pictures, poetry, all that kind of 
stuff, she said they revealed what you were like inside. She said they revealed your soul" 
(Ishiguro 173). It is not until the end of the novel that the real purpose of the gallery is 
explained by Miss Emily: "We took away your art because we thought it would reveal 
your souls. Or to put it more finely, we did it to prove you had souls at all" (Ishiguro 
255).  
The guardians' reduction of the students' art and creativity to functioning as 
evidence of their humanity—of their very status as human being—echoes the artificial 
relationship between art and humanity that historically characterized Europeans' 
imperialist judgment of the nonwhite subject. Discussing the way that the humanness of 
black Africans was assessed by Europeans during the Enlightenment, Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr. writes that:  
Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Europeans had wondered 
aloud whether or not the African "Species of Men", as they most commonly put it, 
could ever create formal literature, could ever master "the arts and sciences." If 
they could, the argument ran, then the African variety of humanity and the 
European variety were fundamentally related. If not, then it seemed clear that the 
African was destined by nature to be a slave. (8)  
 
Gates goes on to give the example of George Moses Horton, an African American slave 
poet in the 1820s whose master promised him his freedom in exchange for an adequate 
return on sales of his poetry (Gates 9). As Gates explains, "Writing, for these slaves, was 
not an activity of mind; rather, it was a commodity which they were forced to trade for 
their humanity" (Gates 9). Such limited criteria for what constitutes art, and therefore 
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what constitutes the human, is little different to the function performed by the clones' 
art. Far from proving their humanity, the hope the students invest in art and education 
only reveals their subjection to a debased ideology premised on a very limited idea of 
what constitutes the human. In recalling the historical ways in which the nonwhite 
subject has been excluded from the human, and in figuring the clones as a racialized 
underclass, Ishiguro's portrayal of the clones exposes the ambivalent nature of race. The 
seemingly post-racial world of the novel reveals itself to be a world saturated in forms of 
racial differentiation and discrimination. 
Ishiguro's racial analogy does not end there; the novel builds on the subtle 
analogy Ishiguro draws between the clones and historically exploited racial and ethnic 
minorities not only by showing the expressed fear of the other but also its 
internalization, tapping into the psychological effects on clones of the stigma they 
experience. After facing disillusionment and being forced into the realization of their 
otherness, the clones begin to exhibit psychological traits of a racialized other and come 
to internalize their apparent social inferiority.  When they leave Hailsham, Kathy, Ruth 
and Tommy move into the Cottages, the last communal area for the clones separated 
from “normal” existence, where they live before they begin their donations or start 
serving as carers.  During their stay, Kathy observes the older students and in particular 
“how so many of their mannerisms were copied from the television . . . the way they 
gestured to each other, sat together on sofas, even the way they argued and stormed out 
of rooms” (Ishiguro 110). Ruth, one of Kathy’s close friends, begins to mimic the older 
students and to use body language seen on television. Kathy is bothered by this 
behavior, eventually telling Ruth “It’s not worth copying” because “It’s not what people 
really do out there, in normal life, if that’s what you were thinking” (Ishiguro 113). Kathy 
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berates Ruth’s behavior in a peculiar manner by highlighting the fact that Ruth is 
attempting to appear less like a clone and more like a member of “normal” society 
through the adoption of language and mannerisms. Kathy acknowledges two crucial 
aspects of the behavior of her peers: that they are copying of the language of the very 
community that oppresses them, and that such mimesis reflects a desire to assimilate 
into the oppressive community. Fanon also writes of this phenomenon, claiming that 
“the more the black Antillean assimilates the French language, the whiter he gets—i.e., 
the closer he comes to becoming a true human being” (Fanon 2). In addition to 
attempting to appropriate the culture of the oppressive community through the mimicry 
of language, the clones declare their very being in an effort to be recognized as “a true 
human being,” a status they have been denied. 
The clones’ effort to assimilate culminates in the search for Ruth’s “possible,” the 
original person from which she was cloned, who is a member of the outside society. 
While at the Cottages, two of the older students inform Ruth that they may have seen 
her possible, someone who looks exactly like her, and they gather the group for a trip 
outside of the enclosure. Kathy describes the fervor over the subject of possibles, stating,  
“One big idea behind finding your model was that when you did, you’d glimpse 
your future. Now I don’t mean anyone really thought that if your model turned 
out to be, say, a guy working at a railway station, that’s what you’d end up doing 
too. We all realized it wasn’t that simple. Nevertheless, we all of us, to varying 
degrees, believed that when you saw the person you were copied from, you’d get 
some insight into who you were deep down, and maybe too, you’d see something 
of what your life held in store” (Ishiguro 127) 
 
The clones’ desire to find the person they were copied from in order to get “insight into 
who you were deep down” reflects their abrogated identity. Despite knowing that their 
lives are truncated and their paths are invariably set, they retain a semblance of hope in 
a different reality. The clones have no positive sense of being, having been denied 
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humanity by the rest of society, but they do not acquiesce to the idea that they exist 
purely to serve economic and medical purposes. Nonetheless, they lack a clear sense of 
self, and the search for possibles is a representation of their psychological struggle. The 
prospect of seeing her possible is an important idea for Ruth in particular, and she lives 
vicariously through the notion that her model is a successful businesswoman. This 
fantasy is shattered when Ruth and her friends find the woman, and after watching her 
closely, decide that she is not Ruth’s “model” after all. 
After the search fails, Ruth’s attitude takes a significant turn.  She flies into a rage 
and exposes the deeply internalized demeaning picture of herself that society has 
imprinted on her soul by making the claim that all the clones are modelled from the 
lowest class denizens of society, “modelled from trash. Junkies, prostitutes, winos, 
tramps. Convicts maybe, just so long as they aren’t psychos.” Ruth tells her friends: 
“That’s what we come from . . . If you want to look for possibles, if you want to do it 
properly, then you look in the gutter. You look in rubbish bins. Look down the toilet, 
that’s where you’ll find where we all came from” (Ishiguro 152). The hope that her model 
was doing what she herself wished to do gave Ruth a vicarious sense of humanity and 
belonging. Once the suspicion is confirmed false, the hope of her own humanity Ruth 
held close was gone. Through the extreme analogy of trash as useless, defective, dirty 
and worthless, Ishiguro clearly emphasizes how the marginalized, who are denied 
recognition and through this suffer a life-long oppression, internalize the image that is 
imposed upon them and thereby are denied the chance of ever feeling equal. As scholar 
Chu-chueh Cheng argues, “it is this sacred divide between God-willed genesis and 
human-wielded mimesis that affirms the humans’ superiority and justifies their 
exploitation of the clones, so much so that the clones themselves are made to believe 
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that their oppression and exploitation are justified” (189). Stuart Hall attests that 
oppressive forces have “the power to make us see and experience ourselves as Other . . . 
this expropriation of cultural identity cripples and deforms” (226). How deformed the 
clones’ image of themselves is shows in Ruth’s claim that they are worthless. Their 
struggle therefore reflects both the psychological repercussions of racialization and 
rationalized class exploitation. 
At the same time, an epidermal notion of race is not absent from Ishiguro’s novel 
either. The first explicit appearance of race in Never Let Me Go occurs at the end of the 
narrative in a climactic scene when Kathy and Tommy find Madame and Miss Emily, 
two of the guardians at Hailsham, in order to ask for a deferral on their donations. 
Kathy and Tommy have heard from other students at the Cottages that such a deferral is 
possible on the grounds that they can prove they are in love. Ultimately, Miss Emily 
shatters this small hope by telling them that what they have heard is merely a rumor, 
meaning they have no hope for delaying their donations. They have been created to 
deliver themselves up to gradual, ritualized, and rationalized slaughter from which there 
can be no escape. While this scene critically communicates the fact that Kathy and 
Tommy’s fates are sealed, it also serves to subtly introduce a unique character: George, 
Miss Emily’s Nigerian caretaker whose presence Kathy has been struck by before.  After 
the cruel news is delivered, Miss Emily informs Kathy that she has quietly observed her 
prior forays seeking her out: “‘Once not so long ago, I passed you sitting on that bench 
out there, and you certainly didn’t recognize me then. You glanced at George, the big 
Nigerian man pushing me. Oh yes, you had quite a good look at him, and he at you. I 
didn’t say a word, and you didn’t know it was me” (Ishiguro 256; 57).  
Why does George have a good look at Kathy—is it merely because she stares at 
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him, or does he intimate some fellow feeling? Miss Emily tellingly dwells upon the gaze 
between Kathy and George, a character who seemingly has no purpose in the plot, and 
constructs a reciprocal recognition between the two characters who occupy a space in 
the shadows of society. In this moment, a connection is drawn between the two 
exploited groups, the clone and the servant. Kathy must care for the weak and eventually 
donate her body to serve the outside community—just as George, too, cares for the now 
weak Miss Emily and must relinquish the autonomy of his body for the service of those 
in power. Ishiguro connects the two characters in their similar exploitation, and also 
alludes to British colonialism in his use of a Nigerian caretaker, who reminds the reader 
of another dehumanizing method of racialized exploitation that has left class disparity 
and hatred in its wake.  
Although readers are only presented with a brief glimpse into George's life, there 
are clear parallels between his situation and that of Kathy. Like the clones, George is a 
carer and the only character differentiated by race in the novel; his ethnicity seems 
linked to the social role that he inhabits. As Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg 
have argued in an essay on the cultural contexts which have made cloning conceivable, 
"One can also imagine the cloning of nonwhite, able-bodied, good-natured, caring, 
docile, moderately smart but not too intelligent bodies to do the service work that those 
more privileged seem to demand more and more. Whereas biological cloning is still for 
the most part a function waiting to be realized, the cultural cloning of preferred types to 
inhabit segregated spaces is everyday practice, especially among social elites" (1068). 
George is the culturally cloned equivalent of the genetically cloned Kathy; he is not only 
a carer but a servant forced to respond to the barked orders of his mistresses: "'I've told 
you what to do. Just do as I explained” (Ishiguro 245) and “George! George!” (Ishiguro 
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261). Where Kathy must care for her fellow clones as they slowly die through donating 
before sacrificing her own body, George, circumscribed by his racial difference, is 
destined to serve and care for Miss Emily. His shadowy, voiceless presence in Kathy's 
narrative—a "faint thump" (244), "muffled" (245), the "footsteps" (253) answering the 
door— reflects his peripheral status in the world of the normal, much like the clones. 
The combination of the clones’ treatment, education, internalized inferiority, and 
connection to George within the novel demonstrate that Kathy and her friends occupy a 
position in society analogous to historically exploited racial and ethnic minorities, 
although the poignant irony is that Kathy’s tentative and nostalgic narrative confers 
upon her a greater semblance of humanity than any of the “real” humans or “normals” 
readers meet in the novel. Ishiguro draws this analogy in a subtle way because there is 
little explicit discussion of race or ethnic differences in this imagined world. Despite the 
near absence of racial difference in the novel, Ishiguro skillfully highlights the presence 
of tenuously established “biological” discrimination as the model for the clones' 
subjugation and oppression.  
Much as with “The Black Hand,” Ishiguro’s novel has been dismissed as a 
speculative horror story set in the near past without real connections to modern 
realities. The work is examined from a public relations standpoint, and thus categorized 
as damaging and absurd given the strong ethical standards that guide the transplant 
industry. Nonetheless, I have suggested that the intimate and commodified trade in 
organs—often carried out clandestinely in permissive countries—produces a kind of 
cultural anxiety that surfaces in literary fiction. Though Ishiguro’s story is fictional, his 
narrative nonetheless raises difficult questions on issues of difference and social justice 
that are increasingly relevant. The clones Kathy, Ruth and Tommy are heartbreaking 
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representatives for the exploited specters of society. The association Ishiguro draws 
between clones and marginalized minority groups implicitly criticizes the modern 
practice of “medical tourism,” in which wealthy individuals, generally westerners, travel 
to poorer countries to buy body parts from the most vulnerable sects of society, who are 
either forced or compelled into such circumstances by deep poverty. Transplantation 
procedures have become increasingly sophisticated and offer unforeseen opportunities 
of survival to hundreds of thousands of patients, yet due to the global organ shortage, 
unethical practices like organ trafficking and transplant tourism have progressively 
emerged and spread worldwide, rapidly becoming a highly profitable business for 
organized criminal groups. In fact, in 2007, the World Health Organized estimated that 
out of all transplants worldwide, 5–10% were conducted illegally.  
Ishiguro alludes to this important reality: the fact that there is an organ shortage 
with overwhelming demand will necessarily lead to complicated and often to 
undesirable options. His novel takes it even further and suggests that the people who 
will bear the brunt of this reality will be minorities, people who have historically been 
economically exploited, and who now are prey to biological exploitation. Despite the 
benefits of advancements in organ transplantation, Never Let Me Go elucidates how 
such a procedure is still haunted by “shadow economies” from which a surplus of life is 
extracted and continues to raise difficult questions about exploitation and social justice. 
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Chapter 2: A Change of Heart: Intruders, Intrusions, and the Destabilization of Identity 
in Jean-Luc Nancy’s L’Intrus 
 
I was given a second chance at life in the form of a liver transplant in 2004. While on 
the waiting list I struggled to move around the house, let alone do any exercise. I 
couldn't mind my grandchildren and didn't have the energy to play with them. When I 
received my transplant in 2004 my life changed. – Mary  
*** 
 
“Friday July 13, 2007, I received the precious gift of life! A transplant not only replaces 
an organ. It's like getting a brand new start.” – Heather 
 
*** 
"Receiving a new kidney and pancreas has changed everything for me and my family. 
Before the transplant, my wife used to be afraid to fall asleep at night and would stay 
awake just to make sure I was OK. But after the transplant, everything is different. I 
am living a life better than anything I could have ever imagined and am able to do 
things that previously were beyond my reach. All this has happened after receiving a 
gift from someone I will never meet” – Ken  
*** 
“A new year, a new heart, a new life” – Jeanne 
 
In the decades since the 1950s what has grown as thick and diverse as the 
transplant industry, as ubiquitous and prominent as the waiting lists, is a discourse 
about organs. Transplant discourse from hospitals, organ procurement agencies, donor 
families, and transplant recipients has driven organs into the public vision and lexicon. 
The exchange of ideas, images, stories, slogans, appeals and arguments about organs, 
disseminated from many centers both popular and official, has bred a public familiarity 
with this once exotic form of medicine and generated another kind of “organ trade” in 
sermons about our bodies and ourselves. This transplant community has one 
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recognizable motif evident in each of the quotes seen above: the joyful recognition of the 
resurrection of life, celebrated with statements that communicate a message of renewal, 
rebirth, and gifting (Sharp 7). Driven by increasingly popular social media platforms, 
the healing powers of transplantation are communicated in words and pictures by 
hospitals and transplant networks more fiercely than ever. Such stories often deal with 
recovered transplant recipients running, swimming, graduating, or having a family of 
their own while expressing gratitude for their “second chance.” Even publicity 
surrounding successful transplant cases and stories in magazines and newspapers 
underlines the excitement of “a new lease on life” and the potential of restored family 
life. Other news stories illustrate the positive impact of donation decisions, and are part 
of the ongoing debate that promotes donation from the public (UNOS).  
My aim in this chapter is not to claim that such stories do not express genuine 
gratitude or that organ transplantation does not have enormous positive effects on 
society. Instead, I point out the repetitive aspects of these stories—their highly simplistic 
nature, their use of nearly identical language, and their conformance to a conventional, 
linear narrative form. Collectively, these stories conform to the structure of what 
sociologist Arthur Frank has labeled the restitution narrative, in which the plot involves 
returning to one's previous state of health (Frank 75). As Frank has described, a 
restitution narrative tells the story of getting better through the heroic agency of medical 
practitioners.  The formulaic nature of most stories circulated about the experience of 
organ transplantation and the common use of metaphors of renewal and the “gift-of-
life,” which have been made ubiquitous by the transplant industry, highlight the ways in 
which transplant recipients are educated in and prescribed the proper ways of making 
meaning of their experiences.  
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While this does not mean that statements circulated by organ recipients lack 
sincerity, the public stories of restitution are often carefully orchestrated by transplant 
organizations and aimed strategically to motivate the public to support the idea of organ 
transplantation. Anthropologist Lesley Sharp has described this phenomenon and 
documented how American organ recipients are not allowed by organ-donation 
organizations to dwell on post-transplant complications or hardships in their shared 
statements and “only the healthiest and most upbeat speakers are invited to give public 
addresses” (Sharp 114). She continues to argue that “participation in the public realm of 
organ transfer necessitates various forms of silencing,” as accounts of suffering and 
failure are counterproductive to the purpose of promoting organ donation (Sharp 123). 
Thus, organ transplant recipients learn to perform the “good” transplant story and 
sometimes conceal their difficulties, fears, and uncertainties about a process that has 
altered their lives.  
This claim does not deny that many people truly have successful outcomes after a 
transplantation. A tremendous number of lives have been saved by this procedure, and 
some people even experience no complications after surgery. Nonetheless, jutted up 
against stories about transplantation as a means of being reborn are more complex post-
transplant realities: serious complications like organ rejection or the recurrence of a 
previous disease after the procedure. The restitution narrative fits well into a clinical 
paradigm that focuses narrowly on a cure—as Frank notes, patients become ill, visit the 
doctor, receive treatment, and return to their everyday routines as if illness were a 
temporary detour—but often transplant recipients exist in a state of “persistent 
liminality,” caught between the worlds of the healthy and the sick (Crowley-Matoka). 
Even organ recipients who do not experience rejection stemming from the transplanted 
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organ cannot just return to a pre-illness state. Transplantation represents the exchange 
of one set of hardships for another: recipients must adhere to immunosuppression 
regimens for the rest of their lives and continue to have medical appointments where 
their conditions are monitored for possible signs of rejection years after the procedure is 
completed (Sharp 10). Consequently, representations of organ transplantation as 
bounded events, which end once a heart, liver or kidney is successfully replaced, fail to 
effectively capture the on-going drama of transplantation: for recipients, the perpetuity 
of rejection fears and immunosuppressant drug regimens; for donor kin, the organs of 
loved ones that continue to “live on”; for cultures, the ambiguity of “brain-dead” bodies 
(Lock) and the ambivalence of “patchwork” men and women (Fox & Swazey).  
Even more problematically, the prescriptive rhetoric of renewal and gifting 
directs, in large part, what can be felt and said in the context of transplantation, making 
anything outside that realm seem non-normative or even shameful. In 1979, the use of 
the term “Frankenstein Syndrome” to describe the psychology of organ transplant 
patients appeared for the first time in the American Journal of Psychiatry (Dubovsky, 
Metzer & Warner). In the notes of a clinical report on the progress of a liver transplant 
recipient, a man called Mr. A struggled with the aftermath of a surgery that extended his 
life. At first, Mr. A felt that the transplant was “an alien piece of meat” that stood 
separate from the rest of his body. Over time, he began to imagine that he and the liver 
are joined in an odd sort of union, quipping, “That’s a hell of a way to talk about my new 
wife!” when his doctor speaks of the transplanted tissue as foreign. Eventually this 
metaphor, which externalizes difference between his body and the new organ, 
transitions to a conception of self that internalizes these rifts. Mr. A diagnoses himself 
with what he calls the “Frankenstein Syndrome” which involves feeling, as he describes 
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it, like he has been “pieced together . . . as opposed to being a regular human being.” The 
imagery Mr. A uses to express his post-surgical identity veers towards the dark, 
monstrous, and maternal. He brings a cultural imagination of Frankenstein into the 
space of medical authority in order to articulate his sense that transplant surgery, rather 
than revitalizing him as a whole, broke him into a fragmented mass of parts. The clinical 
report, however, pathologizes this self-conception and suggests that Mr. A’s non-
normative experience stems from his failure to properly integrate his new “introject” 
(the liver and qualities that associate it with the donor) into his already unstable 
conception of self.  
Today, some transplant recipients still experience ongoing or episodic emotional 
issues post-transplant that are not attributable to medications or pathophysiological 
changes, suggesting that the procedure can and does produce pressing new questions 
about how patients incorporate a transplanted organ into their sense of self and how 
this change impacts their identity. The authorized narrative fails to encompass the 
myriad psychosocial complexities involved in the transfer of an organ from one person 
to another and gives no credence to recipient doubts and fears, other than as 
manifestations of psychological disturbance (Shaw). For most patients, the only 
appropriate response to the question “how are you?” is to respond with reference to 
measures of diet, energy levels, respiration, pulse rate, and so on, all the expected 
biomedical markers of recovery. What is scarcely mentioned in such settings is any 
sense of the lived body and its affects. 
This chapter will thus focus on a text, Jean-Luc Nancy’s L’Intrus (The Intruder), 
that resists the dominant trend in medical transplant commentary to produce a 
restitution narrative about gifting and renewal. Nancy’s piece L’Intrus, published in the 
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year 2000, uses the philosopher’s experience of heart failure, heart transplant, and 
cancer resulting from the immunosuppressive therapy he received to prevent organ 
rejection, to discuss concepts of strangeness and articulate the multiple forms of 
intrusion he experiences, the most obvious being the intrusion of a “stranger” in the 
form of his newly transplanted heart.  Nancy’s piece is a narrative of crisis and chaos, 
one that makes use of metaphor and gothic imagery to describe the conflict and 
discomfort of both the transplantation process and the experience of post-transplant 
personhood.  At its core, his essay is one of discomfort, featuring no resolution or a 
return to normalcy, and questioning the Cartesian machine model that allows for the 
easy transference of “spare parts.”  He grapples with the enigma of a self that cannot 
properly be located anywhere in the body yet cannot be apart from one. In his case, the 
medical intervention of new biotechnologies unravels a coherent story of selfhood and 
necessitates the narration of a new subjectivity. Narratives like Nancy’s are rarely 
circulated, yet I argue that part of the value of his work and his meditations on the 
ambivalent valences of the “gift” are that he refuses to conceal his disorientation with a 
process that has ultimately saved his life. The lack of narrative coherence is itself a valid 
representation of a potential reality (even if temporary) for some transplant recipients. 
Ultimately, even from his experience of chaos, I believe, we can derive a lesson about 
human connectedness through his narrative. 
The creative arts have long offered patients the chance to reframe their 
experiences on their own terms. As Rita Charon says, writing illness might enable some 
patients “to give voice to what they endure and to frame the illness so as to escape 
dominion by it.” L’Intrus documents Jean-Luc Nancy’s transplant experience, but it is 
not a narrative of restored, meaningful order. Nancy’s account of his heart transplant 
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takes the form of what Arthur Frank has defined as the chaos narrative: “the opposite of 
restitution,” containing a plot which “imagines life never getting better” (Frank 97). For 
Nancy, there is no promise of an end to his experience of estrangement—“the stranger’s 
coming will not cease being a disturbance and perturbation of intimacy”—just an 
incessant unfolding of exposures to intrusion that seem to multiply and finally open 
onto a future that is radically uncertain (Nancy 2).  He chooses to marry his chaos 
narrative with tinges of the Gothic through the central metaphor of his piece, that of the 
intruder which “insists, and breaks in” (Nancy 2). Definitions of a Gothic mode tend to 
feature two elements: a narrative voice marked by horror, distress, or diminished agency 
and a sense of claustrophobic confinement or invasion that may be literal or 
metaphorical (Smith 84; Punter 184; Botting 3). Indeed, the staple protagonist of classic 
eighteenth-century Gothic is a vulnerable individual desperately seeking to understand 
a menacing environment veined through with bewildering text.  L’Intrus fits the Gothic 
framework in a myriad of ways. The speaker communicates a sense of being trapped in 
an opaque narrative outside his own control, largely because of the newly overwhelming 
role medical intervention, in the form of appointments, hospitalization, medication, and 
surgery, now plays in his life. He documents a lost confidence in any stable identity 
largely as a result of multiple forms of intrusion by organs, viruses, cancerous cells, and 
medical technology and therapies. Ultimately, his piece catalogues the annihilation of 
previous notions of self: “In me there is the intrus (intruder), and I become foreign to 
myself” (Nancy 9). 
What exactly is the intruder Nancy speaks of? He begins his essay by describing it 
as that which “enters by force, through surprise or ruse” and throughout his narrative, 
weaves together multiple strands of reflection on illness and transplantation into an 
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image of threefold intrusion by: 1) his original failing heart, 2) the newly transplanted 
and immunologically strange heart, and 3) man himself through his use of medical 
advances to extend life. In contrast to Susan Sontag, who claims that “the healthiest way 
of being ill is one purified of metaphorical thinking,” Jean-Luc Nancy deploys the 
metaphor of the intruder as his only means of getting a grip on a process that produces 
multiple forms of disruption to his conceptions about his body, self, and identity (Sontag 
3).  
For Nancy, it becomes clear that the original stranger that first makes its 
intrusive presence known is his own heart. Prior to his heart’s failure, Nancy claims that 
the organ had been as absent to him as “the soles [of his] feet walking” (Nancy 3). In a 
state of health, his awareness of his heart amounted to a kind of absent presence; he had 
no need to be conscious of his body’s automatic functions until his heart obtrusively 
called for attention precisely through its impending failure, “intruding through its 
defection.” As scholar Catherine Waldby has described, people in end-stage illness often 
feel a dramatic change in their psychological conception of their body’s interiority as a 
result of such a development: “For the healthy person, the interior is not physically 
mapped in any degree of detail” but for “the patient awaiting transplant, the body’s 
interior is psychically reorganized, divided into a threatened self and the degenerate 
organ that threatens self” (246). Her assertions are consistent with Nancy’s experience. 
His diseased organ radiated strangeness and provoked disquietude throughout his body 
and mind.  As his body sickened, Nancy lost a sense of his body as a unified whole and 
instead began to feel himself as “an assembly of functions” that were becoming 
increasingly autonomous and therefore “strange.”  The heart declared “broken” beyond 
repair forced itself into Nancy’s consciousness by provoking jarring arrhythmias and 
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palpitations. When doctors told him his organ was failing, he felt “the physical sensation 
of a void already open in [his] chest” and began to question if his heart was “giving up,” 
then “to what degree was it really his ‘own’?” (Nancy 3). Ultimately, Nancy recognized 
that the intrusion he experienced from his failing heart brought, or revived, the threat of 
the imminence of death. He claims: “The stranger who intrudes upon my life (my feeble, 
winded life, which at times slides into a malaise that verges on a simply astonished 
abandonment) is none other than death” (Nancy 7). Every heart palpitation, disturbance 
or ache he experienced in his worn-out body was received as a missive from the future, 
forewarning the end.  
Nancy received a heart transplant as a matter of what his doctors called “simple 
necessity” to prevent his early demise, yet the notion of his heart’s replacement began to 
transform his conception of self before this point. He characterizes the intrusion of his 
diseased heart upon the self as a moment of rupture, following which the subject can no 
longer instill confidence in any stable identity. The fact that Nancy’s understanding of 
self was threatened by a physical change in his body is significant in its demonstration 
that the self can and does change as the body changes. This viewpoint contrasts strongly 
with the mainstream and broadly Cartesian Western tradition in which mind and body 
are separated, and the self is deemed to have an independent existence that is 
unchanged by even violent transformations to the body (Descartes). Under this 
tradition, Nancy should still be the same person with the same core identity despite his 
need for an organ transplant. Biomedicine in general, and surgery in particular, rely on 
this notion that the body can be remolded either without consequences to the embodied 
subject, or at least in the case of some aesthetic procedures, with only controlled 
consequences. In transplant surgery, by contrast, the whole point is to replace some 
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intrinsic part of the bodily interior with living organs or tissue taken from the body of 
another, but with a similar aim: that of the continuance of the existing and unchanged 
self. Yet, for Nancy, having a heart that was “stiff,” “blocked,” “rusted,” and out of sync 
did impact his sense of self (Nancy 4).  
This first intruder imposed itself upon him in a manner beyond the physical. 
Nancy’s sense of internal crisis and fear from knowing his “heart was becoming [his] 
own foreigner” was largely provoked by the fact that the organ he needed replaced was 
specifically the human heart, the organ loaded with the most symbolic connotations 
((Nancy 4). Philosopher Drew Leder remarks that at the core of modern medical 
practice is the Cartesian revelation that the living body can be treated as essentially no 
different from a machine. For Nancy, this model of easy replacement cannot overcome 
the heart’s renown as a symbolic epicenter of the soul, life, feeling, volition, and 
intellect. Nancy recognizes that “a life ‘proper’ . . .  resides in no one organ” but remarks 
that without the heart it is “nothing” (Nancy 8). He is explicit about his inability to 
“disentangle the organic, the symbolic, and the imaginary” from his view of the human 
heart. His narrative thus reveals that the estrangement inherent in replacing an organ is 
not solely a function of receiving the tissue of another person but also in part a 
consequence of the specific organ that must be replaced and its cultural or symbolic 
significance.  
In this thinking, Nancy is not alone. Since the 1960s the transplanted heart has 
been the subject of much anxiety and turmoil as well as amazement and gratitude. This 
paradox results from the extraordinary meanings with which the heart as an organ is 
invested. Though surgeons and physicians began regarding the heart as a “mere pump” 
in the mid-nineteenth century, it has retained its associations with emotion and the 
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human soul that give the transplantation of the heart greater weight than any other 
organ (Carter 5). The brain has come to dominate discussions of people as thinking, 
feeling beings, yet the heart still occupies a special, almost sacred significance in 
Western culture. Its representation is used extensively as a visual symbol, from 
Valentine’s cards to love letters, from graffiti to tattoos. No other human organ has had 
as many meanings attached to it. People speak of someone “having the guts” to do 
something, or call someone intelligent “a real brain,” or remark that someone is “thick-
skinned,” but these are scattered examples compared to the over a hundred heart-
related phrases in contemporary English. The heart still aches and breaks over lost love; 
we say that people have hearts of stone or hearts of gold or the heart of a lion; hearts 
“sink” when people are sad but “soar” when they are happy. Some people wear their 
hearts “on their sleeves” while others set their hearts on things. People often speak 
“from the heart,” or are described as having big hearts, hard hearts or cold hearts. These 
phrases show that in symbolic and linguistic terms, people are far from viewing the 
heart merely as a pump. Medical anthropologist Margaret Lock claims that: 
“It is abundantly clear that donated organs very often represent much more 
than mere biological body parts; the life with which they are animated is 
experienced by recipients as personified, an agency that manifests itself in 
some surprising ways, and profoundly influences subjectivity.” (Lock 225) 
 
For no organ is her statement truer than the heart.  
In fact, even Christiaan Barnard, the surgeon who performed the world's first 
human-to-human heart transplant in 1967, could not resist the heart’s powerful 
symbolism. Barnard had previously described the heart by claiming it “was a mechanical 
pump and it worked like one,” but when it comes to describing the heart in Louis 
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Washkansky’s chest upon seeing it exposed for the first time, Barnard cannot restrain 
the poetics of his description:  
“So it went, rolling and heaving, one beat after the other, like a boxer about to 
collapse in the ring, fighting on, throwing out punches without strength, pitifully 
going through the footwork even though he could no longer see his opponent, 
ducking and feinting in a drunken wobble, until he was open to one blow which 
could crumble the tottering figure of what once had been a champion. We had 
arrived in time to witness the final moments before the last blow – the dying of a 
fighting heart.” (280)  
Barnard cannot prevent himself from personifying Washkansky’s heart and what is 
more personifying the heart as Washkansky to create the, probably unintended, effect of 
the heart’s collocation with the self. The boxing metaphor and the ideal of the brave 
fighter are inspired by the fact that Washkansky himself had been a boxer and was 
widely described by those who knew him as a tenacious fighter. Caught between wanting 
to argue for the mechanical and unromantic functioning of the heart and wanting to 
extol its mysterious tenacity, courage and infusion with its bearer’s selfhood, Barnard 
appears to oscillate between the two representations, yet his writing largely suggests, 
much like Nancy’s L’Intrus, that it is challenging if not impossible to portray the 
replacement of the heart as a purely technical procedure without emotional weight. 
Despite living in a scientific age, it is almost impossible to view the heart as a pure 
biological entity among others, a “pump” only, rather than the center of emotional life. 
The heart is loaded with meaning and identity; therefore the intruding heart (still his old 
one) alienates Nancy from his body.  
Building on the intrusion caused by the failure of and need to replace his original 
heart, with all of its symbolic significance, Nancy introduces the second intruder in the 
form of the new, immunologically foreign replacement heart. This is an intruder that 
Nancy would like to welcome, but the pains and plagues following a procedure involving 
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having one’s sternum cracked and chest cut wide open in an operation that lasts for 
several hours makes such hospitality difficult. While his surgery is successful from a 
technical standpoint, he is quick to point out the faultiness of the “doubtful symbolism” 
imagining organ donation to be an uncomplicated “gift” from someone in which a 
“solidarity, if not fraternity” is instituted between donor and recipient (Nancy 8). For 
Nancy, there is a fundamental incompatibility between this notion of fraternity and the 
transplant process; no organ can easily be accepted as a “gift” because bodies, through 
their immune responses, recognize foreignness and respond with violent hostility. The 
threat of rejection looms for any transplant recipient: 
“Very soon, however, the other as foreign element...may manifest itself: not the 
woman or the black, not the young man or the Basque; rather the immune 
system’s other – the other that cannot be a substitute, but has nonetheless 
become one. This is called “rejection”; my immune system rejects that of the 
other...it is a matter of what in the intrusion of the intrus is intolerable.”  (8) 
For Nancy, it is not foreignness as evinced in a fictive, static conception of race, gender, 
or nationality that causes the self to feel intrusion and to reject the intruder. Rather, it is 
the process of contact and touch, of the dynamic misalignment between two immune 
systems. Once the stranger’s heart has been grafted on to the void left behind by the 
excision of Nancy’s “old” heart, his body is described as permanently propped-open, 
never to close again by virtue of the “immune system’s other” that has entered and 
altered his physiological signature (Nancy 8). Because of the lack of harmony between 
his immune system and the new heart, Nancy cannot see this new organ as a 
representative of his renewal; he claims it “cannot be a substitute”—only by virtue of the 
immunosuppressant drug regimen he is placed on, can it even become tolerable (Nancy 
8). 
 This need to repress one’s own immune system to maintain an organ also 
 59 
presents numerous difficulties for Nancy. One such difficulty is accepting the 
foreignness of the state that the medical regimen produces in the body to protect the 
graft against rejection. Living with a donor heart means entering into a never-ending 
struggle against rejection, the natural reaction of the immune system to defend the body 
against intruders. Here indeed is a great schism: the body as it self-immunizes 
excessively, trying to rid itself completely of the intruding element, is in the same 
gesture undermining and destroying the self from within. In rejection there is auto- 
immunity, at once a preserving-weakening, a repairing-fracturing, and above all an 
overwhelming betrayal. Paradoxically, to reject the donor heart, this strange corporal 
element, is to retain one’s own immunity. Nancy documents his belief that he has lost 
part of his identity in his experience of medical intervention because “identity is largely 
equivalent to immunity.” Alfred Tauber, a philosopher of biology, was one of the first 
scholars from the field of traditional philosophy to chart the concept of selfhood as 
deployed in scientific immunological theory. Tauber argues that with the Darwinian 
revolution and the revelation that organisms are in a constant state of flux and 
evolution, identity, for the first time, becomes a problem. Immunology arises out of the 
sets of issues resulting from this problem: “If the self is not given, it must be defined in 
process, which in turn requires a mechanism to identify self and . . . recognize the other” 
(Tauber 3).  
In wrestling with these issues, selfhood becomes a key metaphor for 
understanding immunological processes of identifying what belongs to the organism 
proper and rejecting that which does not.  Nancy’s consideration of his transplant and 
illness reflects Tauber’s consideration of the immune self as a discursive process of self-
articulation. Tauber’s claim that immunology is part of a medical project to “uncover an 
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ontological basis of identity” is borne out in Nancy’s description of immunosuppression, 
in which changes to the immune system disrupt one’s physiological signature or 
identity. In taking immunosuppressants, his body loses its ability to recognize itself—to 
distinguish between what is him and what is not him, what is familiar and what is 
strange. This lifelong treatment focuses on neutralizing one’s own immune system to 
accept the strange element, but once again there is a new process of alienation taking 
place.  Nancy documents experiencing the blurring of the borders between singularity 
and strangeness, between intruder and individuality. Medical practice renders Nancy “a 
stranger to himself: stranger, that is, to his immune system’s identity—which is 
something like his physiological signature” (Nancy 9).  
Nancy finds no way to reconcile himself with this second stranger: his new heart. 
Intrusion multiplies and actually makes itself continually known in the infinite 
complications of decreased immune defense. He claims: “What cures me is what infects 
or affects me” and gives examples of this paradox through the various infections he 
contracts (Nancy 12). He becomes familiar with shingles and cytomegalovirus as well as 
other “strangers” that have been roused by the necessary depression of his immune 
system. Old viruses that “have always been lurking in the shadow of [his] immune 
system” but were hitherto safely tamed by his immune system, are also able to make their 
presence known in his new state of weakness (Nancy 9). Nancy even develops cancer as 
a side-effect of the immunosuppressant drug regimen and must endure further more 
difficult treatment to rid himself of a “worn, jagged, and ravaging” lymphoma (Nancy 
10). In describing this second intruder, Nancy documents the struggle of living with an 
immune system that is “at odds with itself, forever at cross purposes, irreconcilable.” His 
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narrative critically dispenses with the notion of a core self that persists unchanged over 
the period of transplantation and in his rejection of the “renewed life” trope, legitimizes 
the acknowledgement of disturbances to embodiment and personal identity. 
As the meaning Nancy’s metaphor of his transplant experience shifts, the last 
form of intruder is introduced: man himself, through his use of medical advances to 
extend life. Nancy describes the intimate and concrete practices which invade his body, 
‘‘the intrusion . . . of  tubes, clamps, sutures, and probes” making him objectify his body 
and provoking an alienation that aggravates his physical suffering (Nancy 7). Indeed, 
the experience he describes in one of becoming posthuman, a human-robot hybrid, a 
“science-fiction android,” or “the living-dead” (Nancy 13).  Though he willingly chooses 
to undergo the transplantation procedure, the experience makes him wonder: “why and 
how is there no longer for us—we of the ‘developed countries’—a ‘right’ time to die 
(scarcely before the age of eighty; and will not this age continue to increase)?” Doctors 
tell Nancy that his own heart was “programmed” to last until he turned fifty. Dying at 
the age of fifty was in no way scandalous only two or three centuries ago, yet today it is 
not the norm, at least in the Western world. Nancy recognizes that in the current 
biomedical-technological culture, there is an intense pressure to prolong life, oftentimes 
at extreme costs that sometimes simply extend or exacerbate people’s suffering; man 
has become “the most terrifying and troubling technician” (Nancy 13).   
While Nancy does not express regret at his decision to receive a heart transplant, 
he comes to regard it as a kind of ambivalent success. He has lived much longer than he 
would have with the procedure, but this life extension does not erase the difficult of a 
life marked by “a certain continuity of intrusion” by the medical establishment: 
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“Added to the more-than-daily doses of medication, and being monitored in the 
hospital, are the dental effects of radiation therapy, the loss of saliva, alimentary 
supervision and life scanned and reported upon by way of multiple indices, each 
of which inscribes other possibilities of death.” (Nancy 12) 
 
The technical possibilities to save lives with the help of medical achievements have, for 
Nancy, definite drawbacks which he goes to great lengths to emphasize. Particularly, the 
chronic consequences of his heart transplant are diminished control over the body by 
way of the constant medical intervention. According to his own experience, the patient 
pays heavily for his life extension.  
The ultimate outcome of Nancy’s three major experiences of intrusion is that “one 
emerges from this adventure lost. One no longer knows or recognizes oneself” (Nancy 
12). He ends his narrative on this disconcerting note, and in his honesty makes no 
attempts to reframe his experience in a more positive light. L’Intrus is a master text of 
uneasy exposition in which wounds, scars, bodies, and boundaries are crossed, revealed, 
concealed, and opened up, yet even in its darkness, the narrative provides hope through a 
recognition of the universal state of human beings.  Comparing himself to something 
“like a science-fiction android,” Nancy does not uncritically embrace this cyborgification, 
but he does come to recognize that he is not alone in experiencing it (Nancy 13).  As 
Donna Haraway's has argued in her most famous essay, "The Cyborg Manifesto," 
everyone is a cyborg. The realities of modern life happen to include a relationship 
between people and technology so intimate that it is no longer possible to tell where 
people end and technology’s intrusion begins. For Haraway, being a cyborg is not only 
about radical intervention—like how many bits of silicon a person has under their skin or 
how many prosthetics one’s body contains. The use of items as ubiquitous as glasses or 
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phones makes virtually everyone a cyborg. For Nancy, the post-transplant experience is 
utterly alienating and destabilizing for his sense of identity, but he too recognizes that he 
is not alone in feeling “the intruder”—modern life is filled with quintessential 
technological bodies. In his continued struggle with a new heart, Nancy has a necessity 
for community; though he himself finds technological interventions in body deeply 
distressing, perhaps his only point of comfort in L’Intrus comes from acknowledging that 
the intrus is present in everyone in some way. 
The need to honor chaos stories like L’Intrus is both moral and clinical.  Nancy’s 
narrative is not uplifting, but in its honesty, it may serve to validate the experiences of 
people who suffer in a similar manner yet feel the need to hide such sentiments. As 
Arthur Frank has remarked, people whose reality is being denied “can remain recipients 
of treatments and services, but they cannot be participants in empathic relations of 
care” (Frank 109). There is understandable eagerness to see narratives representing 
illness in ways that make it bearable or positive, both for the patient and for the medical 
reader who wishes to empathize with the patient’s experience, yet the darker side of an 
illness experience – the chaos, pain, passivity, medical intrusion – exists as well and 
being an ethical witness to the patient experience requires resisting the expectation for 
narrative consolations and showing a willingness to hear chaos. L’Intrus makes an 
important contribution to the understanding of the contemporary human experience 
with medical interventions like organ transplantation. Insights gleaned from his 
narrative about the relationship between the body, medical intervention, and identity 
are valuable not only for other patients, but also for transplant professionals who can 
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learn to develop new supportive interventions to ease distress and improve people’s 
recovery.  
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Conclusion 
In this project, I have examined works including Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me 
Go, Charles Garden Bower’s “The Black Hand,” and Jean-Luc Nancy’s L’Intrus (The 
Intruder) in an attempt to show the relevance of these texts to understanding the 
complex process of organ transplantation and its impact culture and the human psyche. 
Working against the standard narratives of altruism, gifting, and renewal, the literature 
I have surveyed contains gothic elements that re-imbue the transplant process with 
emotion and highlight organ transplantation’s dark associations with organ theft, racial 
exploitation, and intrusion and identity disruption. I have also explored several 
intersections where fictional works engage with historical and present events 
surrounding organ transplantation and communicate cultural truths. Using these texts, 
I argue for the importance of changing the dominant metaphors of transplant from 
those of a simple “gift” or “spare part” to address the more intricate questions about the 
hybridization of human bodies, definitions of death, race, identity, and bodily integrity 
that are raised by this process.  
The Gothic in particular has served as a cultural lightning rod for exploring 
anxieties surrounding organ transplantation, providing a stage where bioethical issues 
can be investigated. It renders visible tensions that trouble the stability of any single 
narrative about the transplant body; it explodes them out into complicated, sometimes 
incompatible, pieces. While the use gothic imagery to describe organ transfer is seen in a 
largely negative light by transplant centers, I have attempted to show the usefulness of 
particular texts to understanding both the lived experience of the transplantation 
process and its complex history.  
Nevertheless, even if the usefulness of the Gothic for understanding the 
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transplant process is never acknowledged, it appears that the association between the 
two will never cease to exist—at least not under current biomedical paradigms. Recent 
news headlines make this point clear. A recent search on organ transplants includes 
headings such as “First inter-species 'Frankenstein' transplant is achieved,” “Illegal 
Kidney Trade Flourishes as Victims Await Justice,” and “Mom carrying baby without 
brain to term—to donate the organs,” demonstrating that the process of understanding 
this procedure’s impact on culture and human life is constantly being negotiated (CNN). 
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